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Executive Summary 
Framework 
Disaster preparedness plans have the potential to protect at-risk populations from harm 
and maintain or quickly restore the routines and functions of civil society.  But even the 
most thorough and prescient plan will fall short if it does not reach across professional 
jurisdictions and agencies. 
Workgroup Charge and Products 
To make the jump across sectoral lines faster and more focused, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response (COTPER) supported a joint initiative between CDC’s Public Health 
Law Program (PHLP) and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(DOJ/BJA) in 2007.  The two organizations convened a 28-member Workgroup on Public 
Health and Law Enforcement Emergency Preparedness that included experts representing 
four sectors:  public health, law enforcement, the judiciary, and corrections. 
Between June 2007 and February 2008, the Workgroup members met to identify 
opportunities for improving cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional collaboration (the focus 
of this framework document) and to craft two other tools: a model Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) for joint investigations of bioterrorism, and a guide for developing 
MOUs for strengthening coordinated, multi-sector responses to influenza pandemics and 
other infectious disease threats.  The framework document is designed to be a starting 
point for the four Workgroup sectors, setting forth the major gaps and problems in cross-
sectoral and cross-jurisdictional emergency preparedness planning as well as some key 
opportunities for addressing them.  Additional copies of this framework report and of the 
guide for developing an MOU are available from either of two Web sites:  
 www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/emergencyprep.asp or  
 www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/pandemic_main.html. 
Guiding Principles 
As the Workgroup members considered ways to improve cross-sector coordination for 
emergency preparedness, they were guided by several core principles: balancing federal, 
state, and local power and responsibilities; balancing the common good with safeguarding 
of individual liberties; preserving the rule of law; and building on existing emergency 
response coordination mechanisms and structures wherever possible. 
Relationships Among Sectors 
While the most complementary and close connection might be between law enforcement 
and public health, the other sectors represented on the Workgroup — the judiciary and 
corrections — also are key partners.  For example, in a contagious disease epidemic, a 
public health official may request a quarantine of a group or area and law enforcement 
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officers would be responsible for enforcing it, but legal challenges to either public health 
or police authority quickly would engage the court system.  Likewise, an infected person 
resisting an isolation order might be arrested, but could not be admitted to a crowded jail 
or health-care facility without endangering other inmates, staff, or patients.   
The sectors represented on the Workgroup share overlapping responsibilities for the 
public’s health and welfare, yet in general and in most jurisdictions, they tend to operate 
in isolation from one another despite sharing profound common interests in protecting 
the public’s health and safety.  Many factors contribute to this status quo, including a 
complicated jurisdictional landscape, different approaches and jargon, and misconceptions 
about each other’s roles and contributions.   
Action Steps 
Workgroup members identified a set of specific action steps, described below, that have 
particular potential to address existing barriers and misconceptions.  These opportunities 
for action, grouped into four main categories, are intended to make cross-sectoral and 
cross-jurisdictional collaboration more feasible, productive, and common — without 
duplicating the many existing initiatives (such as the National Incident Management 
System and Incident Command Structure (NIMS)) designed to streamline emergency 
preparedness and response.  The purpose of presenting these options is not to recreate or 
discount these important efforts, but rather to build on them in the specific area of cross-
sectoral and cross-jurisdictional planning and preparedness. 
Organizing to Implement Action Steps 
To optimize preparedness at any jurisdictional level (i.e., local, state, territorial, tribal, 
federal), agencies and organizations require a comprehensive understanding of the other 
sectors’ roles, responsibilities, legal authorities, and assets that relate to responses to 
selected public health emergencies (e.g., natural disasters, contagious disease epidemics, 
suspected biological or chemical terrorism).  Therefore, each jurisdiction may first need to 
organize by establishing a framework for periodically convening senior representatives 
from each sector to review and address these and related considerations.   
 
Action steps include: 
 
 Establishing a standing steering committee to direct the jurisdiction’s initiative for 
improved, coordinated, multi-sector response. 
 Developing a detailed plan to achieve full capability to mount a coordinated, multi-
sector response to public health emergencies.   
 Integrating the steering committee’s plan into the jurisdiction’s NIMS-compliant 
emergency planning/management plans. 
 
 Establishing direct linkages between the steering committee and the jurisdiction’s 
emergency planning and management systems. 
ii 
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 Establishing direct linkages with counterparts in adjacent jurisdictions (e.g., cities, 
counties, states, territories, tribes, Canadian provinces, and Mexican states). 
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
Beyond organizing to consider implementation of actions, additional steps may be 
necessary to achieve comprehensive understanding of each sector’s roles, responsibilities, 
legal authorities, and assets that relate to public health emergency response. 
 
Action steps include:  
 
 Defining roles and responsibilities for an effective coordinated, multi-sector response 
with a NIMS-compliant response plan; specifying roles and responsibilities for 
each sector; identifying key players and their back-ups; engaging other sectors; 
addressing implications that special populations have for each sector; developing 
and promoting the use of practical and operational products focused on cross-
sector coordination (such as scenario-based exercises); establishing local- and state-
level cross-sectoral groups; and reviewing and mapping local jurisdictions. 
 
 Identifying and reviewing legal authorities that each of the four sectors need to fulfill 
their defined roles and responsibilities, including examining potential sector-
specific variations in legal authorities and roles under different scenarios; 
clarifying enforcement roles and responsibilities in different scenarios; and 
reviewing the implications for each sector of a declared state of emergency. 
  
 Identifying gaps in existing legal authorities and tools for coordinated response involving 
two or more of the sectors. 
 
 Developing an action plan to strengthen or address gaps in legal authorities, tools, and roles 
and responsibilities necessary for coordinated response, including approaches for 
improving access to ready-to-use instruments (e.g., draft emergency declarations, 
quarantine orders, mutual aid agreements, bench books). 
 
 Reviewing and specifying due process considerations in relation to the roles and 
responsibilities of each of the sectors during a public health emergency, including, 
for example, practical and logistical aspects such as the format and timing of 
written orders (e.g., for quarantine and isolation); service of orders; and affected 
parties’ access to review and representation, particularly when movement and 
contact may be restricted. 
 
Communication and Information-Sharing 
Coordinated emergency preparedness and response hinge on professionals in each of the 
four sectors — public health, law enforcement, corrections, and the judiciary — having 
ready access to communications across the sectors and also to key types of information.  
In this context, “communication” refers to a network of interaction among professionals 
and agencies across the four sectors in a given jurisdiction and to established networks of 
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communication with other sectors, elected officials, the media, and the public, as well as 
the electronic systems to support communication.  “Information” refers to substantive 
content that professionals in the four sectors need to have in order to perform their roles 
before, during, and following public health emergencies.  
 
Action steps include: 
 
 Establishing a workgroup to assess the existing communications network for interactions 
among the four sectors and to recommend any improvements needed, including 
assessing the adequacy of existing electronic systems.    
  
 Developing communications plans for events that cross sectors that encompass what 
constitutes a crisis communication issue involving agencies/organizations in 
different sectors, and those for which a single-sector agency or organization would 
be responsible for most communication.  
 
 For each sector, communicating each agency’s/organization’s emergency plans for 
coordinated response to counterparts, including steps for establishing a central 
hub and for identifying the implications of each agency’s/organization’s 
continuity of operations plans for the others. 
  
 Designating Points of Contact (POC) for each sector’s agency/organization to facilitate 
consistency in messages to the media and the public and specifying information each 
sector requires of other sectors for different phases of an emergency. 
 
 Establishing specific agreements on exchanging sensitive information between sectors, 
including provisions on who will authorize the release of information, and how it 
will be protected and further disseminated after an exchange occurs.  
 Identifying barriers to sharing needed information, including determining how 
jurisdictions could prepare information in such a way (e.g., through removal of 
personal identifiers or information that would trigger clearance requirements) that 
it could be shared among agencies in different sectors.  
 
 Working with the media before a crisis to arrange for assistance during an emergency in 
communicating useful information to the public and countering rumors and 
misinformation.  
 
 Developing ready-to-use legal instruments (e.g., joint investigation protocols, protocols 
for joint implementation of quarantine and other social distancing measures, draft 
orders, court pleadings, and temporary regulatory waivers) and jointly developed 
information resources (e.g., briefing packets, fact sheets, press releases, and public 
service announcements). 
 
Education, Training and Exercises 
Within each jurisdiction, the steering committee with oversight for coordinated, multi-
sector response should consider plans for assessing and identifying gaps in the 
iv 
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preparedness and response competencies among each sector’s workforce, and 
strengthening the workforce through training, exercises, after-action reviews, corrective 
action programs, and other educational initiatives.  
 
The Workgroup suggests that delivery of most of the following topics would result in 
optimal benefit if provided through joint training or exercises for individuals from 
different sectors and jurisdictions:  
 
 Develop a plan to assess the existing emergency preparedness and response competencies 
among workforce members in each of the four sectors and to deliver 
training/exercises and corrective action programs/improvement plans to address 
gaps and needed competencies. 
 
 Develop a curriculum comprising a variety of topics for emergency preparedness 
training and exercises that advance collaboration across sectors and jurisdictions, 
including roles and approaches; exercises that transcend current COOP planning; 
“Infectious Diseases 101” for non-public health professionals; and joint 
bioterrorism investigations. 
 
Workgroup members also described a “cyclical” training model that places education, 
through training and exercises, within the broader context of sectoral/agency roles and 
responsibilities.  The elements of this model — which apply equally for preparedness for 
intentional (e.g., bioterrorist) or natural (e.g., an influenza pandemic or other infectious 
disease threat) events — require agencies, organizations, and multi-sector steering groups to 
identify players, their roles and responsibilities; identify required skills and competencies; 




It is the Workgroup’s hope that this framework and set of opportunities for action will 
spark conversations, plans and concrete actions among public health, law enforcement, 
the judiciary, and corrections — and that these efforts will traverse and erode the 
boundaries separating four sectors whose interests in the public’s health and safety are 
both shared and profound. 
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I. Framework  
Need for Cross-Sectoral Framework  
Well before the events of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks that followed in 
the fall of 2001, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
portfolio of core public health functions included preparing for and 
responding to a variety of man-made and natural emergencies.  In the last 
decade, a series of disasters — including the events of 2001, the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, and the threat of pandemic 
avian influenza — has drawn more attention and resources to emergency 
preparedness.  Then in 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita proved that 
natural disasters can be as destructive and terrifying as their man-made 
and naturally occurring infectious disease counterparts.   
These actual disasters, near misses, and impending threats, so different 
from one another, demonstrated that investments in the public health 
system fortuitously strengthen preparation for both man-made and 
natural disasters.  Indeed, improvements such as stronger local health 
departments, new laboratory techniques, upgraded surveillance and 
communication capabilities and heightened vigilance by physicians of 
symptom complexes among their patients have yielded public health 
payoffs regardless of whether a disease outbreak is the work of man or 
nature.  
As a result, CDC’s investments in emergency preparedness have 
accelerated and expanded the capacity of state, territorial, and local health 
departments as well as capacity within CDC in the past decade, especially 
since 2001. Law enforcement agencies, the corrections system, the 
judiciary, and many other sectors have re-examined their own policies and 
procedures, identified potential gaps, launched task forces and 
committees, and drafted plans for continuity of operations (COOP) for 
future emergencies.  As described below in greater detail, many of these 
initiatives shifted from disaster-specific scenarios to a more comprehensive 
all-hazards approach, adaptable to a wide range of naturally occurring and 
man-made disasters. 
These efforts to strengthen each sector’s all-hazards preparedness and 
continuity are essential and ongoing.  However, among the many lessons 
of our most recent disasters is the realization that no sector or jurisdiction 
is likely to face a major disaster or its aftermath alone.  Effective use of 
disaster preparedness plans has the potential to protect at-risk populations 
from harm and maintain or quickly restore the routines and functions of 
civil society.  But even the most thorough and prescient plan will fall 
short if it does not reach across professional jurisdictions and agencies. 
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Workgroup Charge and Products  
To make the jump across sectoral lines 
faster and more focused, CDC’s 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response 
(COTPER) supported a joint initiative 
between CDC’s Public Health Law 
Program (PHLP) and the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (DOJ/BJA) in 2007.   Building 
on previous work together, PHLP and 
BJA convened a 28-member Workgroup 
on Public Health and Law Enforcement 
Emergency Preparedness that included 
representatives from four sectors:  public 
health, law enforcement, the judiciary, 
and corrections.  (A list of acronyms used 
in this document is provided in 
Appendix A, followed by a full listing of 
Workgroup members in Appendix B and 
consultants and staff in Appendix C.) 
The Workgroup’s members represent 
sectors and agencies that share joint 
responsibility for the public’s health, 
safety and welfare.  In the case of states’ 
public health and law enforcement 
agencies, as part of the executive branch 
of government, their authority to protect 
the public derives from police powers — 
those powers reserved under the U.S. 
Constitution to the states to create and implement laws that protect the 
public’s health, safety and welfare.  As the third branch of government, 
the judiciary’s role in public health has long been overlooked, but it is 
crucial because of the role of the courts in preserving the rule of law 
during and after an emergency, resolving disputes, and assuring the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals. The corrections system is 
responsible for the health of millions of incarcerated Americans who 
move through its facilities.  Corrections institutions face unique 
challenges in maintaining security, providing health care to inmates, and 
supporting correctional officers during a disaster. 
Organizations Represented on the Public 
Health/Law Enforcement Emergency 
Preparedness Workgroup 
• CDC Public Health Law Program 
• DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance 
• DOJ Counterterrorism Section 
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
• National Association of Attorneys General 
• City, County, University, and Transit 
Police Departments 
• State Departments of Public Safety 
• Association of State Correctional 
Administrators 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation, WMD 
Directorate 
• Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials 
• National Association of County and City 
Health Officials 
• Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists 
• Association of Public Health Laboratories 
• U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response 
• National Center for State Courts 
• Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
• National Institute of Corrections 
This overall framework document and two related tools are the product of 
a series of three Workgroup meetings between June 2007 and February 
2008 as well as interviews, literature reviews, revisions and discussions 
among Workgroup members between meetings.  One tool is a model 
MOU for joint investigations of bioterrorism, and the other is a guide for 
2 
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developing MOUs for strengthening coordinated, multi-sector responses 
to influenza pandemics and other infectious disease threats.  The MOU 
on strengthening multi-sector responses and this framework document are 
available from either of two Web sites: 
 www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/emergencyprep.asp or  
 www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/pandemic_main.html. 
The audiences for this document include the federal, state, territorial,1 and 
local agencies collectively responsible for the public’s health, safety and 
welfare.  These include, but are not 
limited to, the four sectors 
represented on the Workgroup:  
public health, law enforcement, the 
judiciary and corrections.  
The framework document is 
designed to be a starting point for 
these sectors, setting forth the 
major gaps and problems in cross-
sectoral and cross-jurisdictional 
emergency preparedness planning.  
Included are short- and long-term 
steps and considerations that policy 
makers, officials, task forces, 
committees and the like can take to 
begin addressing these gaps.   
Guiding Principles 
As the Workgroup members considered ways to improve cross-sector 
coordination for emergency preparedness, they were guided by several core 
principles.   
First, federalism — the constitutional division of sovereignty between 
federal and state governments — frames the interactions between public 
health and law enforcement, as well as the actions of the courts.  Sharing 
public health authority, public health officials at the federal, state, and 
local levels must cooperate in developing efficient and effective means to 
address public health threats.  Likewise, public health must collaborate 
with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to ensure effective 
and equitable enforcement of public health measures.  In turn, federal, 
state, and local law enforcement must cooperate with one another.  
Depending on the facts of particular cases, people or other legal entities 
                                                             
1 Throughout this document, the term “state” refers to “state and/or territorial” when referring to 
jurisdictions. 
Framework Document Organization 
I. Framework Overview 
• Need for Cross-sectoral Framework 
• Workgroup Charter 
• Guiding Principles 
• Relations Among Sectors 
II. Opportunities for Action 
• Organizing to Implement Opportunities 
for Action 
• Roles and Responsibilities 
• Communication and Information 
Sharing 
• Education, Training, and Exercises 
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that are adversely affected by public health measures or their enforcement 
may file challenges in federal or state courts.  As a result, it is crucial for 
public health and law enforcement officials and their attorneys to have a 
firm grasp of federal and state court jurisdiction and procedures, as well as 
public health law.   
Exercising the states’ police powers to protect the public’s health during 
emergencies (as well as from more routine threats) requires balancing the 
common good with safeguarding individual liberty interests (including 
freedom of movement, individual autonomy, and expectations of privacy).  
The constitutionality of the use of police powers in a public health 
context initially was articulated over 100 years ago by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, in which the Court upheld 
the conviction of a Cambridge, Massachusetts 
resident who failed to comply with a smallpox 
vaccination requirement as a proper exercise of 
the police power to protect public health.2  
However, the Court limited its ruling to say 
that exercise of the power may not unduly 
interfere with the fundamental rights of 
individuals.  The “perennial tension” between 
the public’s health and individual liberty 
interests has been inherent in the exercise of 
police powers ever since.3  Contemporary due 
process and other constitutional standards 
ensure maintenance of the delicate balance 
between protection of public health and 
individual rights.  
A paramount role for courts during emergencies and other public health 
events is to preserve the rule of law.  For example, courts may issue 
orders authorizing certain actions or affirm orders issued by public health 
or law enforcement officials to protect the public’s health.  Courts also 
may intervene to restrain public health or enforcement actions that are 
determined to interfere unduly with civil rights.  To perform their 
important role, courts must be able to continue operating in an 
emergency.  An “all-hazards” approach to emergency contingency 
planning should address public health threats, such as an influenza 
pandemic, particularly since there may be a need to provide timely due 
process access to the courts for large numbers of people who may be 
affected by public health emergency actions.  Addressing the operational 
needs of the judicial system will ensure that courts are available to serve as 
guardians of liberty and protectors of the rule of law — even if face-to-face 
                                                             
2  197 U.S. 11 (1905) 
3 Cetron M and Landwirth J.  Public health and ethical considerations in planning for quarantine.  
Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 78 (2005);325-330. 
Guiding Principles for 
Coordinated Emergency 
Preparedness 
• Balance federal, state and 
local power and 
responsibilities  
• Balance the common good 
with safeguarding of 
individual liberties 
• Preserve the rule of law 
• Align with existing emergency 
preparedness structures and 
activities 
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interactions become difficult or impossible and the court’s business 
proceeds through closed hearings, video conferences, and the like.      
As discussed in greater detail below, the Workgroup members also 
recognize that many emergency preparedness activities are underway at the 
federal, state, territorial, and local levels.  Efforts to improve all hazards 
emergency preparedness across sectors and jurisdictions should build on 
these existing structures and activities whenever possible.   
Relations Among Sectors 
While the most complementary and close 
connection might be between law 
enforcement and public health, the other 
sectors represented on the Workgroup — 
the judiciary and corrections — certainly are 
key partners.   
For example, many scenarios implicate the 
use of quarantine and/or isolation. 
Isolation is the separation or restriction of movement of people who are 
sick with an infectious disease, in order to prevent transmission to others.  
Quarantine is a restraint upon the activities — e.g., physical separation or 
restriction of movement within the community/work setting — of an 
individual(s) who has been exposed to an infection, and is not yet but 
may become ill, to prevent the spread of disease.  Many respiratory 
infections, including pandemic influenza, can be transmitted by a person 
before he or she develops symptoms of the illness. 
In a serious contagious disease outbreak, a public health official may 
request a quarantine of a group or area and law enforcement officers 
might be responsible for enforcing it, but legal challenges to either public 
health or police authority quickly would engage the court system.  
Likewise, an infected person resisting an isolation order might be arrested, 
but could not be admitted to a crowded jail without endangering other 
inmates and staff.  Ideally, the implications of these scenarios would be 
discussed before the person resisting quarantine first enters custody. 
As this report indicates, in recent years, there have been significant 
improvements in coordination across these sectors, although significant 
challenges remain.  The sectors represented on the Workgroup share 
overlapping responsibilities for the public’s health and welfare, yet in 
general and in most jurisdictions, historically they have tended to operate 
apart from one another.  Many factors contribute to this separation, 
autonomy, and lack of shared experience between agencies and disciplines 
that actually have profound common interests. 
“Many public health preparedness 
plans include law enforcement — 
yet most law enforcement 
professionals are not aware of this 
and, more importantly, do not see a 
role for themselves in a public 
health crisis.” 
 
 — Commander William T. Bowen 
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Some of the gap is a product of custom and culture, with different 
philosophies, approaches, and even language contributing to the gap 
between sectors. Until recently, the opportunities and incentives to work 
and train together were relatively rare.  Some of the gap is resource-driven; 
appropriations to federal agencies are made at the Department Secretary 
or agency level and remain preserved in their compartments as they are 
disseminated to state and local agencies, reinforcing the silos from which 
they started.  
Current disaster scenarios have changed this equation quite radically.  It is 
difficult to imagine a severe contagious disease pandemic, for example, 
that would not require the involvement of both law enforcement and the 
judiciary.  Courts would issue orders and/or hear challenges to orders that 
have been issued.  Infected people would have to be isolated, groups and 
individuals might be quarantined if exposure were a possibility, public 
events would be cancelled and schools may be closed, travel might be 
curtailed, and curfews enforced. As Commander William Bowen (former 
chief of the Albany, New York Police Department) has written, “Many 
public health preparedness plans include law enforcement — yet most law 
enforcement professionals are not aware of this and, more importantly, do 
not see a role for themselves in a public health crisis.”4  Likewise, public 
health officials may be assuming a level of assistance and preparation 
from local law enforcement in their pandemic planning that has not been 
tested in joint training or exercises, nor detailed with the specificity that 
front-line public safety officers would require to act. 
As these examples suggest, the Workgroup enters the realm of all-hazards 
emergency preparedness with a rather tall order:  fostering cross-sector 
efficiencies that will improve emergency preparedness by filling procedural 
gaps, identifying authoritative consistencies, improving communication 
and supporting joint training.  As discussed below, the Workgroup’s 
discussions and categories of products are intended to provide a 
philosophical framework and specific tools that will make it easier and 
more efficient for state and local jurisdictions to reach across the 
jurisdictional and sectoral divides that constrain current emergency 
preparedness efforts.  
The Workgroup members also recognize that other sectors beyond the 
four described here — such as agriculture, education, and transportation — 
already are part of existing coordination efforts and would potentially be 
involved in the types of scenarios described in this document. 
Parallel but Separate Professional Worlds 
Closer proximity among public health, law enforcement, the courts and 
corrections has revealed different approaches and priorities.  For example, 
at its onset, the 2001 anthrax attack triggered only a public health 
                                                             
4 Bowen WT.  Law enforcement and public health.  The Police Chief.  2007;74(8). 
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investigation.  But, in short order, when findings strongly suggested that a 
deliberate and criminal act was unfolding, the public health investigation 
was joined by a criminal one.  (Appendix D provides examples of other 
joint public health and law enforcement investigation topics and events 
that occurred between 1975 and 2003.) 
As several observers have noted, public health and law enforcement have 
learned a great deal about each others’ approaches since then, including 
different definitions of the same terms and concepts (such as “case,” 
“surveillance,” and “evidence,” among others).5  But, the missions of 
public health and law enforcement are fundamentally different.  Public 
health is responsible for stopping the occurrence of infectious diseases and 
other health problems.  Law enforcement is responsible for identifying 
and apprehending people who have committed crimes or pose a threat to 
others.  While both equally share the goal of protecting society, the 
differences in their responsibilities and legal authorities are profound. 
The public health approach to an investigation is rooted in the science of 
epidemiology, in which people are interviewed about their possible 
exposure, other data and samples or material are collected (such as food or 
blood samples), hypotheses generated, and tests conducted to gauge 
whether the hypotheses are correct.6  Even in an emergency — such as an 
outbreak — the emphasis is on thoroughness and scientific accuracy, with 
great deference to expert scientific knowledge and laboratory results. The 
goals of a public health investigation include protecting the public, 
diagnosing the disease, determining who has been or still is at risk, 
establishing if disease transmission is ongoing from a common source or 
spread from person to person, providing treatment or prophylaxis, 
stopping the spread of disease, and protecting public health personnel.7  
Historically, public health investigators only rarely encounter malicious 
intent in their investigations.   
The law enforcement approach to an investigation has many similarities, 
but also some crucial differences.  It too involves interviewing witnesses, 
but the purpose, from the outset, is to identify suspects.  Leads are 
developed and pursued; evidence is carefully collected and tracked.  
However, this process is geared to solving a crime and collecting proof 
that will meet legal (as opposed to scientific) standards — standards 
designed to protect individual rights and the innocent.  Thus, issues such 
as preserving the chain of custody for a particular piece of evidence are a 
                                                             
5 Marcella Layton, presentation to Workgroup, June 8, 2007. 
6 Butler JC, Cohen ML, Friedman CR et al.  Collaboration between public health and law 
enforcement: new paradigms and partnerships for bioterrorism planning and response.  Emerging 
Infectious Diseases 2002;8(10):1152-56. 
7 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of 
Justice, and U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command.  Criminal and epidemiological 
investigation handbook, 2006 edition.   
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priority for law enforcement investigations and typically not a 
consideration for public health ones.8  Law enforcement investigations 
share with public health investigations a paramount interest in protecting 
the public as well as their own personnel.  In addition, investigation goals 
of law enforcement include preventing criminal acts and identifying, 
apprehending and prosecuting the offender(s). 
As noted above, beyond their role in joint public health/law enforcement 
criminal investigations, local police and sheriff’s personnel are likely to be 
involved in an emergency as first responders and as keepers of public 
order.  During the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto, nearly 30,000 people 
(including hospital staff) complied with voluntary quarantine restrictions, 
with very few incidents requiring police involvement.9 In any case, 
whether they are enforcing isolation and quarantine orders, controlling 
crowds, protecting hospitals and vaccine stockpiles, or managing traff
law enforcement are likely to be engaged on the front lines of a serious 
public health emergency or natural disas
ic, 
ter.10   
                                                            
One potential problem is that public health pandemic plans may be 
assuming a level of assistance from local law enforcement that has not 
been well defined, agreed to, or tested with law enforcement agencies 
themselves.  Another issue is that even when such agreements are in place, 
they lack the clear, definitive guidance that law enforcement officers 
would require to act.  For example, if a state quarantine order is defined 
as “Don’t let anybody past this point/door/street,” what exactly does that 
mean?  Does “anybody” really mean anybody?  Should transgressors be 
arrested?  (If so, where would they be taken, especially if a local jail is 
locked down?)  How much force is appropriate? If force were used, what 
kind of liability would an officer and agency face?  How will officers who 
come into contact with exposed or infected individuals be protected?11, 12 
Currently, answers to many of these questions are not clearly defined and 
would be left to the interpretation of officers on the street — a situation 
that both commanders and their subordinates, for good reason, try to 
avoid.  
The judiciary’s role, in parallel with public health and law enforcement, 
includes guarding the rule of law by balancing the needs of government 
authorities against the preservation of individual civil liberties that we 
value as a society.  Before, during and after an emergency, courts may be 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 Fantino J.  2003 SARS outbreak: the response of the Toronto Police Service. The Police Chief 
2005;72(3). 
10 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance.  The role of law enforcement in public health 
emergencies: special considerations for an all-hazards approach. 2006.  [Executive Paper summarizing full 
report] 
11 James Pryor, Seattle Police Department, personal communication, September 27, 2007. 
12 Kamoie B, et al.  Assessing laws and legal authorities for public health emergency legal 
preparedness. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics.  [Special Supplement to 2008;36(1):23-27.] 
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engaged in a number of ways — ruling on whether a particular public 
health statute is constitutional or whether an action (such as a quarantine) 
is authorized, or approving or extending timeframes for public health 
orders.13  At the same time, the judiciary will be trying to continue its 
routine operations while contending with added burdens, such as 
challenges to curfews and cancelled public events, price gouging cases, 
commandeering of private resources,14 or even, in a mass casualty scenario, 
unusually high volumes of wills and estates, as well as dependency, 
custody and adoption cases.15   
Some of these issues — particularly contingency planning for keeping 
courts open and operating during a disaster, perhaps in different locations 
and with fractions of existing personnel — are well covered by internal 
COOP plans and a steadily growing set of tools from different states and 
jurisdictions, such as bench books and other guides for judges and court 
administrators. Still, the Workgroup members recognized the need for 
continued investments in these areas, and urge both the courts and public 
health to continue to explore each other’s worlds.  As noted in Stier et al., 
“Put simply, public health officials, as well as their attorneys, must know 
their way around the courthouse.”16   
Without this familiarity and perspective, public 
health officials might not appreciate some 
philosophical tenets of the judiciary that would 
govern and possibly jeopardize their interactions.  
These vary from one jurisdiction to another, but 
generally are unfamiliar to the public health 
community.  For example, judges place a premium on independence and 
on basing their decisions on the application of relevant law to facts in 
each case.  In many scenarios, this would make it ethically and legally 
difficult for a judge to discuss the substance of a particular case with a 
public health official who is a party to it, without others present.   
Another scenario involves hypothetical “what-if” speculations — for 
example, about due process shortcuts during an emergency.  During an 
emergency, some cases could come before the court ex parte; in these 
situations, judges may suggest methods to address procedural due process 
in orders involving methods of service, for example.  Depending on the 
setting and circumstance, “what if” discussions might not be 
                                                             
13 Task Force on Pandemic Preparedness Planning for the Courts.  Guidelines for pandemic emergency 
preparedness planning: a road map for courts.  Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project at 
American University, U.S. Department of Justice grant number 2006-DD-BX-K013, April 2007. 
14 Ibid. 
15 University of Pittsburgh and Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts.  2006.  Courthouse 
preparedness for public health emergencies: Critical issues for bioterror/biohazard preparedness planning.   
16 Stier DD, Nicks D, Cowan GJ.  The courts, public health, and legal preparedness.  American 
Journal of Public Health, 2007;97(S1):S69-S73. 
“Put simply, public health 
officials, as well as their 
attorneys, must know their way 
around the courthouse.” 
 — Daniel Stier et al., 200716 
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inappropriate, but public health officials should learn to proceed with 
caution so that their interactions foster trust, rather than distrust.   
On the other hand, judges may lack specialized knowledge in public 
health and may benefit from learning about the public health 
implications and rationale behind various statutes (or challenges to them).  
More public health officials, public health attorneys, and court systems 
are acquiring this familiarity and knowledge about one another.  However, 
such exchanges are far from routine, and public health officials require 
opportunities to interact more with court administrators and judicial 
counterparts. 
The corrections system includes correctional institutions that function as 
“total institutions” — i.e., facilities in which inmates are housed in 
isolation from the larger society and lead an enclosed, formally 
administered life that makes them completely dependent on others for 
their care and feeding.  This means that the allotment of staff and 
material resources during an emergency has an immediate effect on the 
population of inmates, making institutional corrections more similar to 
hospitals than to police stations, courtrooms, or parole offices. 
The corrections system encompasses not only 
jail and prison facilities, but also community 
corrections — and thus the millions of men 
and women who are on probation or parole.  
In some jurisdictions, the duties of police 
and sheriff’s departments overlap as well.   
The health issues that arise in both 
institutional and community corrections 
settings affect the large numbers of people 
who move through them, including staff, inmates and visitors.  As such, 
key health-related aspects of incarceration (and subsequent probation or 
parole) can be thought of as an extension of the public health system.  
High rates of turnover (98 percent of those incarcerated eventually are 
released to the community) mean that diseases and conditions cross back 
and forth quite efficiently.  As a result, as noted above, corrections officers 
may have more in common with counterparts running health facilities 
and more familiarity with public health roles and approaches than others 
in the law enforcement arena.  Indeed, a Tennessee Sheriff compared jails 
(with their 1,000 percent turnover per bed per year) to an emergency 
department, and prisons (with a 38 percent average turnover) to nursing 
homes.17 
                                                             
17 Hall D.  Jails vs. Prisons.  [Commentary.]  Corrections Today 2006.  Available at 
http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/justice-public-order/976230-1.html. 
The Corrections System 
• Pre-trial 
• Parole 
• Jails  
• Prisons 
• Probation 
• Juvenile facilities 
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Infectious disease outbreaks in corrections facilities do not always get 
media coverage, but they do provide glimpses into the potential 
consequences — still largely unexplored and unaddressed — of pandemic 
diseases moving rapidly through society.  In March 2007, Sheriff C. T. 
Woody Jr., working in concert with public health colleagues, restricted the 
movement of people in and out of the Richmond City Jail in an effort to 
contain an outbreak of norovirus in one wing of the jail.  During the 
quarantine, none of the 1,500 inmates incarcerated at the time could 
receive family visitors or meet with their lawyers.  Their court hearings 
were rescheduled and they had to spend 24 hours a day in their cells 
(although Sheriff Woody did grant expanded phone and television 
privileges to minimize the tensions of a lock-down situation).  Deputies 
patrolling the building wore protective suits and face masks; those from 
the affected wing did not patrol other parts of the jail (as they normally 
would have).  As the city’s emergency management coordinator said, “The 
biggest job is we are trying to make sure the deputies don’t get sick 
because then you’ve got a much bigger problem.”18   
Protecting the health of corrections officers was the subject of a lawsuit by 
the California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association, alleging that four 
officers at Folsom Prison contracted a contagious strain of methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus, or MRSA.19 
As is the case with the judiciary, some of the effects of all-hazards 
emergencies in the corrections system will be addressed through existing 
COOP and other types of planning.  Even so, it behooves all the players 
in these overlapping sectors to be aware of the implications their actions 
generate for their counterparts in other agencies. 
Misconceptions:  Unease with Disease 
Not surprisingly, the parallel professional universes described above 
sometimes lead to misconceptions about roles, responsibilities and even 
basic facts or knowledge.  In the throes of an emergency, it will be 
difficult to educate, much less convince, skeptical counterparts in other 
agencies about the different risks of exposure to various infectious diseases 
or environmental threats.  Incubation periods, modes (and efficiency) of 
transmission, severity and treatment options — all may be self-evident and 
reassuring to public health personnel, but unknown (and therefore 
frightening) to others.  A better understanding of these nuances of risk 
can help people make better decisions about returning to work, potentially 
                                                             
18 Associated Press.  Jail under lockdown because of norovirus. Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 
2007. Available at: 
http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RTD%2FMGArticle%2FRTD_BasicArticl
e&c=MGArticle&cid=1149193449275&path=%21news&s=1045855934842. 
19 Phua C and Furillo A.  Folsom prison staph illness up, union says.  Sacramento Bee, August 29, 2007.  
Available at: http://www.sacbee.com/101/story/349710.html. 
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exposing family members (or colleagues), wearing protective masks and 
gear and seeking vaccination or treatment. 
Alternatively, some first responders or others involved in a crisis may 
under-estimate their risk of exposure, failing to heed warnings or don 
protective equipment.  Misconceptions about disease-specific dangers also 
can lead to poor decisions.  The rationale for public health decisions 
likely to engage law enforcement, the courts, and corrections needs to be 
well understood if policies and procedures are to be upheld through 
collective efforts of all these sectors.  For example, the use of quarantine 
can still be effective in containing and controlling transmission of some 
diseases, even if compliance is well below 100 percent.  For commanders 
and officers contemplating some level of force to enforce a quarantine 
order, this is crucial information. 
Quarantine and isolation are disease-
specific tools.  Their effectiveness 
depends not only on the nature of the 
disease itself (i.e., the type of infectious 
agent, how efficiently it infects others, 
the disease’s incubation period, and 
availability of antibiotics or other 
treatment), but also on the phase of a 
potential pandemic.  Once a disease 
becomes widespread in a community or 
larger geographic area, mandatory 
quarantine and isolation would be 
unlikely.  However, voluntary compliance 
with quarantine and isolation orders to 
reduce face-to-face contact would be 
possibilities. 
A Complex Jurisdictional Landscape 
In a paper and presentation at the June 
2007 National Summit on Public Health 
Legal Preparedness, Rick Hogan, J.D., 
M.P.H., General Counsel for the 
Arkansas Department of Health, 
described the many jurisdictions that 
potentially engage in an emergency.20  This can include, for example, 
government entities at the federal, state, territorial, and local levels; tribal 
governments; and those of other nations as well. 
Each jurisdiction varies in its relevant legal authorities for different types 
of emergencies, complicating the task of understanding exactly what types 
                                                             
20 Hogan R, et al. Assessing coordination for public health emergency legal preparedness.  Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics.  [Special Supplement to 2008;36(1):36-41.]   
Law Enforcement Agencies in the District of Columbia 
• Metropolitan Police Department 
• Metro Transit Police 
• D.C. Housing Authority Police 
• Amtrak Police 
• U.S. Capitol Police 
• U.S. Park Police 
• Naval District Washington Police 
• Treasury Police 
• Secret Service Uniformed Division 
• Zoo Police 
• Government Services Administration Police 
• U.S. Postal Service Police 
• Defense Protective Service 
• FBI Police 
• Veteran's Administration Police 
• Military District of Washington Police 
• Federal Protective Service 
• Government Printing Office Police 
• Catholic University Police Department 
• Georgetown University Police 
• George Washington University Police 
• Library of Congress Police 
• Supreme Court Police 
• U.S. Mint Police 
• Smithsonian Institution Office of Protective 
Services 
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of legal authorities are available to public health and law enforcement 
officials — and where key gaps might be.  In addition, many local agencies 
grapple with the requirements of multiple jurisdictions.  In Washington 
D.C., for example, a total of 24 law enforcement agencies (including state, 
city, county, transit, airport, university, zoo and ports) would have to be 
aware of each other’s policies, procedures, and relevant statutes — and that 
list does not include counterparts in neighboring Virginia and Maryland.21  
States and counties along the borders with Canada and Mexico add 
international counterparts and authorities to their lists.   
A 2004 study of quarantine powers among the 10 most populous states 
found that although all 10 states had express legal authority to quarantine 
and isolate their residents, the laws varied substantially — especially in the 
absence of a declared emergency.  Without such a declaration, only four 
states had the authority to conduct area quarantine, and only two did for 
group quarantine.22 
As the number of relevant legal authorities and key players associated with 
each set of jurisdictions proliferates, every aspect of responding to an 
emergency becomes more complicated — the chain of command (or, in a 
unified command situation, the size and composition of the team), how 
and under what circumstances information is shared, who the key players 
are, and what the thresholds or triggers are for involving other agencies 
and jurisdictions. 
A number of national initiatives have tried to minimize or resolve some 
of the confusion caused by these jurisdictional variations.  These include: 
 The National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
Incident Command System (ICS) — developed by the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2004, NIMS is a federal 
codification of the ICS and is based on protocols originally 
developed by fire departments in California to cross boundaries 
among firefighters, hazardous materials teams, rescuers and EMS 
teams. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, federal preparedness grants to 
states began requiring compliance with various aspects of 
NIMS/ICS.  Key elements include the ICS (which applies a unified 
command structure and joint decision-making to multi-
jurisdictional emergencies), management of communications and 
                                                             
21 Lt. Douglas Durham, Metro (DC) Transit Police Department, personal communication, 
September 28, 2007. 
22 Shaw FE, McKie KL, Liveoak CA, et al.  Legal tools for preparedness and response — variation in 
quarantine powers among the 10 most populous US states in 2004.  American Journal of Public 
Health 2007;97:S38-S43. 
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information (e.g., interoperable communication systems), and a 
joint information system to deliver consistent information.23 
 Fusion Centers — to promote a stronger two-way flow of 
intelligence information among state and local law enforcement 
agencies and with federal agencies as well.24 
 Model Legislation — the draft Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act (commissioned by CDC in 2001 as an assessment tool) 
and the Model State Public Health Act (prepared by the Center for 
Law and the Public’s Health in 2003) have helped states assess and 
address gaps and inconsistencies in state laws.  The District of 
Columbia and 38 states have enacted at least some provisions of 
the Model State Public Health Act, but it does not address 
multiple sectors or the needs of cities, counties and tribes.25 
 Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs) and the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) — these can cover at 
least five different categories of shared information and supplies 
between and among states:  planning information, epidemiological 
and laboratory data, equipment and/or supplies, unlicensed 
personnel, and licensed personnel. The EMAC is a specific mutual 
aid agreement whose provisions are triggered by a gubernatorial 
declaration of an emergency; smaller-scale events that do not 
trigger such a declaration would require separate MAAs.26  States 
cannot enter into MAAs or EMAC with foreign governments, but 
nonbinding agreements may be an option for sharing information.  
Four Northwestern states (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington) 
are members of the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management 
Arrangement (PNEMA) with the two Canadian provinces (British 
Columbia and the Yukon Territory).  On the East Coast, six New 
England States have a similar agreement with their Canadian 
counterparts.27 
 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).  
Under the HSEEP guidance, joint exercise would enhance 
opportunities for collaboration and further the understanding of 
the sectors by each of its members. 
                                                             
23  Jamieson G.  NIMS and the Incident Command System.  The Police Chief 2005;(72). 
24 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.  Fusion 
Center Guidelines.  April, 2006.  Available at: 
http://www.iir.com/global/products/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf. 
25 Rees C, et al.  Assessing information and best practices for public health emergency legal 
preparedness. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics.  [Special Supplement to 2008;36(1):42-46.] 
26 Stier DD, Goodman RA.  Mutual aid agreements: essential legal tools for public health 
preparedness and response.  American Journal of Public Health 2007;97:S62-S68. 
27 Ibid. 
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Cross-Sector Coordination Example 
 
Combining Law Enforcement, Public Health, HazMat, and EMS:  The Greater 
Louisville Region Joint Emergency Services Unit (ESU) 
 
In 2002, Dr. William Smock was serving as the tactical surgeon for the Louisville 
Metro Police Department’s Metro SWAT team.  His stint with the team led to the 
observation that like many other SWAT teams, Louisville’s was not equipped or 
trained to operate in a HazMat environment. Likewise, HazMat units couldn’t 
necessarily defend themselves against armed threats or provide immediate 
medical assistance if needed.  In a post-9/11 world, scenarios in which all of 
these skills would be needed simultaneously were not hard to imagine.   
 
Dr. Smock’s response was to form a Joint Emergency Services Unit (ESU) that 
brought together members from 20 different public safety and emergency 
response agencies to train together monthly to keep their medical, HazMat and 
tactical skills sharp and ready for deployment.  Every year, the team participates 
in four to six full-scale exercises (in addition to monthly drills and tabletop 
exercises), covering a wide range of scenarios.  Examples include quarantining 
both passive and hostile people in aircraft, airports, and urban centers.   
 
A Command Group determines whether a particular threat warrants a Joint ESU 
response; if so, a customized team is dispatched quickly.  (Team members are 
deputized by the U.S. Marshals service so that they can respond to incidents 
regardless of whether they fall under local, state, or federal jurisdiction.)  The 
Joint ESU normally is used when there is a known or suspected victim/human 
biologic vector or a need for law enforcement within a hot zone.  One deployment 
occurred when a methamphetamine lab exploded in Southern Kentucky, radiating 
a red phosphorous haze into the area while a hostile suspect held the local police 
at bay.  Within 30 minutes, the Joint ESU team arrived to evaluate the chemical 
hazards and deployed a protected, fully equipped eight-person team to secure, 
treat, and evacuate the suspect, who was not only armed but also contaminated 
and injured. 
 
Sources:   
 
Halladey, J.  “Security Team a Force for the Future:  Multi-agency Unit Trains to Handle Terror Threats,” The 
Courier-Journal, Louisville, KY.  10/19/04. 
 
Department of Homeland Security, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS).  “The Greater Louisville 
Region’s Joint Emergency Services Unit.”  (Undated) 
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II. Action Steps 
In 2007, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) — 
specifically, its Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response, and Public Health Law Program — and the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance convened the 23-
member Public Health and Law Enforcement Emergency Preparedness 
Workgroup to develop options and tools that states, tribes, and local 
governments can use to improve their cross-sector coordination for 
emergency preparedness and response.  Members of the Workgroup 
represent the perspectives of public health, law enforcement, corrections, 
and the judiciary. 
 
In a series of meetings and deliberations held during 2007 and early 2008, 
the Workgroup reviewed a large number of proposals for such options 
and tools, focusing particularly on their practical relevance to policy 
makers and front-line practitioners, and their potential contribution to 
achieving greater coordination across the four key sectors.  On the basis of 
its reviews, the Workgroup has identified numerous “opportunities for 
action,” which are presented below.  The Workgroup encourages 
jurisdictions to consider how adapting these options and implementing 
them could strengthen cross-sector coordination and, as a consequence, 
further enhance comprehensive preparedness for all-hazards public health 
emergencies. 
 
The Workgroup members recognize that leaders in jurisdictions 
throughout the country have achieved significant advances in emergency 
preparedness and response, reflecting their own vision as well as lessons 
learned from 9/11 and the 2001 anthrax attacks, the SARS epidemic, 
Hurricane Katrina, preparing for a potential influenza pandemic, 
exercises, and response to many actual emergencies.  A number of 
initiatives, both new and revamped, have addressed improved emergency 
preparedness, including:  the adoption of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS); mutual aid agreements such as the interstate 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); fusion centers to 
share law enforcement intelligence more efficiently; continuity of 
operations (COOP) plans; and the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) 
for Biological and Chemical Terrorism (which connects state and local 
public health laboratories with national public health and military 
laboratories).  The purpose of presenting the options contained in this 
framework document is not to duplicate or discount these important 
efforts, but rather to build on them in the specific area of cross-sectoral 
and cross-jurisdictional planning and preparedness. 
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The Workgroup also recognizes that initiating, sustaining, and expanding 
cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional coordination is a time- and resource-
intensive enterprise and that additional efforts at all levels — federal, 
tribal, state, territorial, and local — may be required to pursue the options 
for action in a comprehensive and timely way. 
 
The action options are organized into four main sections:  
 
1) organizing to implement opportunities for action;  
2) roles and responsibilities;  
3) communication and information-sharing; and  
4) training, education, and exercises.   
 
For each of these, the Workgroup suggests opportunities for concrete 
action, with links to more specific resources when these are known. 
 
Since each sector and jurisdiction are unique and differ in existing levels 
of preparedness planning and collaboration, this document cannot cover 
every situation or remedy.  Instead, it compiles in one place a set of 
options and related tools that can be considered to advance the work of 
emergency preparedness planners at all levels.  The Workgroup members 
note that progress on all four fronts — organizing to implement options; 
clarifying roles and responsibilities; improving planning and 
communication; and testing these through training and exercises — is not 
likely to occur simultaneously.  However, progress in any area should 
improve collaboration across sectors and jurisdictions. 
 
For those jurisdictions interested in more specific templates, the 
Workgroup also developed two more detailed tools as companion pieces 
to this framework document — one addressing joint public health/law 
enforcement bioterrorism investigations and another addressing 
coordination of social distancing interventions for infectious disease 
outbreaks. 
 
Organizing to Implement Opportunities for Action 
Rationale 
To optimize preparedness at any jurisdictional level (local, state, tribal, or 
federal), agencies and organizations require a comprehensive 
understanding of the other sectors’ roles, responsibilities, legal authorities, 
and assets that relate to responses to selected public health emergencies 
(e.g., natural disasters, contagious disease epidemics, suspected biological 
or chemical terrorism).  Therefore, each jurisdiction may first need to 
organize by establishing a framework for periodically convening senior 
representatives from each sector to review and address these and related 
considerations.   
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As noted above, the Workgroup members recognize that organizing in the 
ways suggested below requires time and resources that may be lacking in 
many jurisdictions; thus, ongoing federal, state, and local support may be 
required to move such efforts forward more widely across many 
jurisdictions throughout the United States, instead of in a select few. 
 
Action Steps 
 Establish a standing steering committee to direct the jurisdiction’s 
initiative for improved, coordinated, multi-sector response, with 
membership to include: 
  
 Public health 
 Law enforcement 
 Corrections 
 Judiciary 
 Emergency management 
 Elected officials 
 Senior officials in the jurisdiction’s emergency operations 
center 
 Other potentially relevant sectors (e.g., the National Guard) 
 Legal counsel to all of the above 
  
 Develop a detailed plan — with functional overarching goals, goals for 
each of the four sectors, practical objectives, and timelines — to 
achieve full capability to mount a coordinated, multi-sector response 
to public health emergencies.  Within the plan, consider addressing 






 Evaluation and continuous quality improvement 
 
 Integrate the steering committee’s plan into the jurisdiction’s NIMS-
compliant emergency planning/management plans. 
 
 Establish direct linkages between the steering committee and the 
jurisdiction’s emergency planning and management systems. 
 
 Establish direct linkages with counterparts in adjacent jurisdictions (e.g., 
cities, counties, states, tribes, Canadian provinces, and Mexican states). 
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Cross-Sector Coordination Example 
 
Epidemics and the California Courts 
 
A pandemic influenza outbreak has the potential to disrupt day-to-day court 
operations for months.  In 2006, to help prepare for this scenario in California, the 
Judicial Council of California Administrative Office of the Courts' (AOC) 
Emergency Response and Security Unit and the California Department of Health 
Services' Division of Communicable Disease Control and Office of Legal Services 
jointly developed a guidance document for the court system, Epidemics and the 
California Courts.  The document identifies the key information that California 
judges and court executives should consider in a pandemic influenza scenario, 
how the court system is likely to be affected, and specific actions that could 
minimize disruptions and keep the court system operating as smoothly as 
possible. Epidemics and the California Courts reinforces how important it is for 
both the courts and public health to be aware of their respective core functions 
and their dependence on each other as an epidemic unfolds. 
 
To help courts prepare ahead of time, the document covers Continuity of 
Operations (COOP) topics such as mission-critical functions for courts, workforce 
planning if absenteeism reaches high levels, legal preparedness, 
communications, employee education and safety, jury considerations, and 
technology implications of trying to keep the court system operating (e.g., holding 
hearings and trials by closed-circuit television). 
 
A set of appendices covers more specific information, including requests for 
judicial emergency orders, planning checklists, educational flyers, and legal 
opinions addressing court administration issues during an epidemic. 
 
The full report and appendices are available from the Web site of the California 
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Roles and Responsibilities 
Rationale 
Beyond organizing to consider implementation of actions, additional 
steps may be necessary to achieve comprehensive understanding of each 
sector’s roles, responsibilities, legal authorities, and assets that relate to 
public health emergency response.  Steps to achieve understanding of roles 
and responsibilities encompass specifying functional standards for 
coordinated responses, defining sector-specific roles consistent with such 
standards, and developing legal authorities and tools necessary for 
fulfilling roles and responsibilities. 
 
Action Steps 
 Define roles and responsibilities for coordinated, multi-sector response 
consistent with the jurisdiction’s NIMS-compliant response plan:  
 
 Define response roles and responsibilities for each of the four sectors 
that are consistent with the jurisdiction’s response plan and 
recognize the need for coordination with other sectors, when 
indicated. 
 
 Identify key players and their back-ups — As the first responder 
adage holds, an emergency is no time to be exchanging 
business cards.  In addition to identifying roles and 
individuals, other means (e.g., flow charts, call lists, periodic 
meetings, updates, and joint training exercises) can introduce 
key players to one another before an emergency, build trust, 
increase understanding, and minimize coordination barriers 
before an emergency occurs. 
 
 Use innovative approaches to engaging other sectors — As examples, 
convene a judicial education conference focusing on public 
health law and emergency powers, organize joint law 
enforcement and public health meetings to work through 
quarantine implications, and convene corrections with public 
health to review roles and plans for epidemic response among 
correctional populations. 
 
 Address implications special populations have for each sector — 
Consider each sector’s roles and responsibilities during public 
health emergencies in relation to the most at-risk populations 
(e.g., disabled, hospitalized, non-English speaking, poor, 
homeless, incarcerated). 
 
 Develop and promote use of practical and operational products that 
focus on cross-sector coordination, such as practical scenario- 
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based exercises that include post-exercise evaluations.  
One purpose of these products is to assist in clarifying 
and validating each sector’s roles and responsibilities 
when coordination is required. 
 
 Establish local- and state-level cross-sectoral groups that meet 
regularly to review and exchange information on their 
respective roles and responsibilities in relation to 
coordination during specific scenarios (e.g., joint 
investigations of suspected bioterrorist events, 
implementation of social distancing measures during 
communicable disease epidemics, and coordinating 
evacuation during natural disasters). 
 
 Review and map local jurisdictions, especially for law 
enforcement and public health. Confusion about 
responsibilities may result when jurisdictional 
boundaries do not overlap in clear and functionally 
practical ways, and may have implications for 
memoranda of agreement or understanding between 
different jurisdictions. 
  
 Identify and review legal authorities, gaps, and ways to address gaps 
so that each of the four sectors has the capacity to fulfill its 
defined roles and responsibilities. 
 
 Examine potential sector-specific variations in legal 
authorities, roles, and responsibilities in different 
emergency scenarios and, if there are conflicts in 
authorities, determine how they can be resolved. 
 
 Clarify enforcement roles and responsibilities in different 
emergency scenarios. 
 
 Review implications for each sector of a declared state of 
emergency, including, for example, what emergency 
powers are triggered and whether a declaration affects 
lines of authority, enforcement, and accountability. 
 
 Identify gaps in existing legal authorities and tools for 
coordinated response involving two or more of the sectors. 
 
 Develop an action plan to strengthen or address gaps in legal 
authorities, tools, and roles and responsibilities necessary for 
coordinated response; include approaches for 
improving access to ready-to-use instruments.  The plan 
could encompass: 
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o Draft emergency declarations and protocols for 
implementing declarations of emergency 
 
o Specification of legal authorities triggered by 
emergency declarations 
 
o Protocols for coordinated implementation of 
emergency public health protections (e.g., 
seizure, destruction, or decontamination of 
contaminated property; issuance and 
enforcement of quarantine orders; closure of 
schools and public venues; delivery of mass 
vaccination; evacuation; mass dispensation of 
medications and other countermeasures) 
 
o Protocols for provision and receipt of aid under 
mutual aid agreements 
 
o Responsibility for protection of special and/or 
at-risk populations (e.g., persons who are 
hospitalized and/or disabled; non-English 
speakers; patients with advanced chronic 
disease; homeless) 
 
o Informational resources and tools primary to 
one sector but with a strong subject matter 
overlap with one or more of the other sectors, 
such as public health bench books for the 
judiciary, and epidemic control guides for 
correctional facilities 
 
o Information and guidance on the development 
of personal protective equipment, personal care 
kits, and other measures appropriate for 
safeguarding personnel in each sector during 
periods of emergency response. 
  
 Review and specify due process considerations in relation to the roles 
and responsibilities of each of the sectors during a public health 
emergency, including, for example, practical and logistical aspects 
such as the format and timing of written orders (e.g., for 
quarantine and isolation); service of orders; and affected parties’ 
access to review and representation, particularly when movement 
and contact may be restricted. 
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Sample Pandemic Event Questions/Issues for Local Law Enforcement Consideration 
 
• What is the chain of command and who will make decisions during a pandemic event? 
• What legal authority is there for the actions to be taken by law enforcement? 
• What orders will be lawful or unlawful in such circumstances? 
• What vaccines and antiviral and other medications will local law enforcement personnel (and their families) be 
offered, and how can leaders assure their personnel that the offered vaccines and medication are safe and 
effective? 
• What problems will local law enforcement leaders face if vaccines and medication are not provided to law 
enforcement personnel and their families? 
• How can law enforcement leaders assure their personnel that it is safe to carry out their sworn duties requiring 
close contact with highly infectious persons? 
• How will local law enforcement securely communicate with public health partners, their own agency personnel, and 
personnel in neighboring jurisdictions? 
• What will local law enforcement leaders communicate to the media and the public regarding the law enforcement 
actions taken in the face of a pandemic event? 
• How will rumors inside agencies and in public circulation be countered? 
• What level of force will law enforcement use to enforce an individual containment or community-wide quarantine 
measure? 
• What steps should law enforcement leaders take to maintain control and authority without overstepping roles and 
overstating or understating risks? 
• What lessons have been learned from recent experiences with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the 2003 SARS 
outbreak, especially the travel-related containment measures imposed in Toronto? 
• How will law enforcement carry out their traditional duties while also carrying out these significant additional 
responsibilities, and where will the financial and personnel resources required to carry out these additional 
responsibilities come from? 
• How will local law enforcement leaders and their counterparts in hospitals, public health, transportation sectors, 
local government, and local and state political leaders, not only in their own jurisdictions but in neighboring 
jurisdictions, come together to make meaningful plans as urged in the HHS plan? 
 
Source: Colwell, L.  The Pandemic Influenza Plan: Implications for Local Law Enforcement.  The Police Chief 2006(73). 
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Communication and Information Sharing 
Rationale 
Coordinated emergency preparedness and response hinge on professionals 
in each of the four sectors — public health, law enforcement, corrections, 
and the judiciary — having ready access to communications across the 
sectors and also to key types of information.  In this context, 
“communication” refers to a network of interaction among professionals 
and agencies across the four sectors in a given jurisdiction and to 
established networks of communication with other sectors, elected 
officials, the media, and the public.  “Communication” also refers to 
reliable electronic systems to support rapid, secure communication across 
the four sectors and with partners.   
 
“Information” refers to substantive content that professionals in the four 
sectors need to have in order to perform their roles before, during, and 
following public health emergencies.  This includes information, for 
example, about agencies’ and organizations’ roles and responsibilities, 
tools (e.g., interagency memoranda of agreement and judicial handbooks), 
and information that can be communicated to the media and the public. 
 
A ction Steps — Communications 
 Establish a workgroup to assess the existing communications network for 
interactions among the four sectors and to identify any 
improvements needed to ensure that the agencies have adequate 
methods and forums for communicating with each other, on an 
on-going basis, about developments relevant to their effective 
coordination in emergency settings (e.g., changes in federal or state 
emergency preparedness policy and changes in the nature of public 
health emergency threats). 
 
 Establish a technical committee to assess the adequacy of existing 
electronic communications systems to support coordinated 
emergency response across the four sectors and to identify 
any needed enhancements to those systems. 
 Ensure that the electronic communications systems that serve the 
four sectors comply fully with the technical specifications of the 
jurisdiction’s NIMS-compliant emergency response plan. 
  
 Develop communications plans for events that cross sectors — Plans 
should encompass what constitutes a crisis communication issue 
involving multiple agencies/organizations in different sectors, and 
those for which a single-sector agency or organization would be 
responsible for most communication.  Conversely, the 
involvement of multiple sectors may not necessarily trigger a joint  
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communication response if a single agency or organization can 
communicate on behalf of all sectors. 
  
 For each sector, communicate each agency’s/organization’s emergency plans 
for coordinated response to counterparts through meetings, shared 
documents, training exercises, and other means. 
  
 Within each jurisdiction, the agencies/organizations representing 
each sector (public health, law enforcement, corrections, judiciary) 
could identify steps for establishing an emergency response 
environment with a central hub, which is the 
agency/organization having primary responsibility for 
emergency response planning and functions; the other 
agencies/organizations could ensure their respective plans 
provide for connectivity to the central hub. 
 Agencies/organizations should review each other’s plans for 
continuity of operations, and identify specific implications 
for, as well as questions and concerns that each has of, the 
others regarding continuity of operations; identification 
could be followed by communications and dialogue that 
explore and, if necessary, resolve issues. 
 Assure that responsible officials in each of the four sectors 
understand each agency’s response plans and roles, and that the 
plans and roles of all the agencies support highly effective, 
closely coordinated joint response actions. 
  
 Designate Points of Contact (POC) for each sector’s agency/organization 
to facilitate consistency in messages to the media and the public. 
  
 Designate “internal” and “external” POC — Internal POCs 
include those who are responsible for an agency’s or 
organization’s internal operations, while external typically 
are public information officers. 
 Provide essential information to agencies/organizations in other 
sectors regarding policies and procedures, as well as the identities 
and roles of their own POC, and plans for potential use(s) 
of such information. 
  
 Facilitate cross-sector communications by including representatives from 
other sectors and jurisdictions in working groups, task forces, 
committees and exercises related to preparedness planning. 
 
 Specify information each sector requires of other sectors for different 
phases of an emergency, and develop companion matrices to  
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organize and share such information needs for different 
emergencies with other sectors. 
 
 Establish specific agreements on exchanging sensitive information between 
sectors, including provisions on who will authorize the release of 
information, and how it will be protected and further 
disseminated after an exchange occurs (e.g., if a law enforcement 
officer may have been exposed to an infectious person during an 
outbreak, the health department might need to advise the law 
enforcement agency regarding the nature of the possible exposure).  
 Identify barriers to sharing needed information — Jurisdictions must 
adhere to privacy provisions and may need to determine how 
information could be prepared in such a way that it could be 
shared among agencies in different sectors without violating those 
provisions.  Agencies and organizations also need to inventory the 
various channels (e.g., fax, e-mail) for sharing information with 
other sectors, whether these channels are secure, who has access to 
secure lines of communication, who has security clearances for any 
content delivered through such lines, and who has the authority to 
share information once it is received. 
 
 Work with the media before a crisis to arrange for assistance in 
communicating useful information to the public and countering 
rumors and misinformation during an emergency. Agencies and 
organizations in each sector may need to review the relevance and 
roles of media in emergency situations, determine who will serve as 
the POC with the media for particular types of information, and 
orient media representatives to specific emergency scenarios. 
 
Action Steps — Information Sharing 
As noted above, “information” refers to the substantive content that 
professionals in each of the four sectors need to have in order to perform 
their roles before, during, and following public health emergencies.  It 
includes information about agencies’ and organizations’ roles and 
responsibilities, tools (e.g., interagency memoranda of agreement and 
judicial handbooks), and information that can be communicated to the 
media and the public. 
 
 Form a “critical information” committee to review the information the 
four sectors need to perform their roles in coordinated planning for, 
and response to, all-hazards public health emergencies and to 
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 Specify information each sector requires of other sectors for 
different phases of an emergency, and develop companion 
matrices to organize and share such information needs for 
different emergencies with other sectors. 
  
 Develop and disseminate templates, checklists, and other tools that policy 
makers and practitioners in the four sectors can use to assess the 
status of their preparedness for coordinated emergency response, 
including, among other elements, their emergency legal 
preparedness. 
 
 Develop operational MOUs that support coordinated response and 
provision of resources among the jurisdiction’s public health, law 
enforcement, and corrections agencies. 
 
 Develop ready-to-use legal instruments and a shared library of legal 
documents (e.g., legal memoranda, opinions, references, joint 
investigation protocols, protocols for joint implementation of 
voluntary quarantine and other social distancing measures, draft 
orders, court pleadings, and temporary regulatory waivers) that will 
facilitate rapid, coordinated response to public health emergencies. 
 
 Prepare jointly developed information resources (e.g., briefing packets, 
fact sheets, press releases, and public service announcements) for 
use with the media and the public during responses to public 
health emergencies. 
 Develop continuity of operations plans for agencies and organizations 
and ensure that they support effective interaction across the sectors 
during an emergency response (e.g., interaction over the release of 
a corrections inmate who completes his sentence during a public 
health emergency and whose release must be coordinated by the 
courts, the prison administration, local law enforcement, and the 
public health agency charged to protect the entire community, 
including the released inmate, from a disease outbreak). 
 
 Capture “lessons learned” about coordinated response from actual public 
health emergency response efforts and from exercises for use in 
improving cross-sector coordination in future emergencies. 
 
 Develop scholarly and practice-based reference materials on technical issues 
requiring coordination between two or more sectors, such as the FBI-
CDC Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Handbook28 
and  
                                                             
28 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, and 
U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command.  Criminal and epidemiological investigation handbook, 2006 
edition, available from http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/CrimEpiHandbook2006.pdf. 
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Cross-Sector Coordination Example 
 
Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: Training Examples from the Fairfax 
County, Virginia Police Department 
 
As part of a review of the Police Department’s critical infrastructure capacity and 
Continuity of Operations Planning in 2006, the Fairfax County Police Department 
prepared a memorandum for all Police Department staff explaining the threat of 
pandemic influenza; basic planning assumptions under low, medium, and high 
levels of severity; Police Department responsibilities and expectations during 
each phase of a pandemic; essential services and authorities; communication 
strategies (including different points of contact for different aspects of the 
pandemic); lines of succession, critical files and databases; agency policy 
considerations; and personal protection and logistics. 
 
To ensure that each staff member had an opportunity to become familiar with the 
memorandum’s content, the Department organized a series of meetings, 
simulation exercises, and training events.  These ranged from requiring that all 
employees watch a Department of Health video during roll call to simulation 
exercises that staged a dry run exercise for the strategic distribution of 
medications.   
 
Instead of trying to cover every aspect of pandemic influenza planning at once, 
the Department’s leaders made a conscious decision to provide generic 
information first, but to add more specific training (e.g., on using and storing 
protective equipment) as the threat level becomes more acute. 
 
Source:  Memorandum from Major Josiah L. Moser, Commander, Fairfax County Police Department 
Technical Services Bureau, to Command Staff regarding pandemic influenza planning (File 06-162; October 
31, 2006).   
 
 
Education, Training and Exercises 
Rationale 
Preparedness for all-hazards emergencies is challenging not only because of 
the complex governing legal regimens, but also because effective response 
demands close coordination among each of the four sectors — public 
health, law enforcement, corrections, and the judiciary — as well as other 
highly diverse sectors.  Effective coordination, in turn, hinges on multi-
                                                             
29 www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/workplaceplanning/lawenforcement.pdf 
C D C / D O J  P U B L I C  H E A L T H / L A W  E N F O R C E M E N T  
E M E R G E N C Y  P R E P A R E D N E S S  W O R K G R O U P  
 
disciplinary professionals’ attainment of understanding of their respective 
and shared roles and responsibilities.  Accordingly, within each 
jurisdiction, the steering committee with oversight for coordinated, multi-
sector response should consider plans for assessing and identifying gaps in 
the preparedness and response competencies among each sector’s 
workforce, and strengthening the workforce through training, exercises, 
and other educational initiatives.  Systematic assessment of gaps should 
assist with identification of high-priority, cross-sector training needs and 
topics, as well as with incorporation of such topics into a long-term, 
“cyclical” curriculum of training and exercises. 
 
Action Steps — High-Priority Training Topics  
The Workgroup suggests that delivery of most of the following topics 
would result in optimal benefit if provided through joint training or 
exercises for individuals from different sectors and jurisdictions.  The 
effects of this approach include cross-sector exposure to and shared 
understanding of perspectives, as well as fostering relationships and trust 
that can be crucial to smooth coordination during response to an actual 
emergency. 
 
 Develop a plan to assess the existing emergency preparedness and response 
competencies among workforce members in each of the four sectors 
and to deliver training/exercises and corrective action 
programs/improvement plans to address gaps and needed 
competencies. 
 
 Explore existing training resources — e.g., the Association of Schools of 
Public Health network of Centers for Public Health Preparedness 
or CDC’s Public Health Law Program — to build on existing 
curricula and avoid “reinventing the wheel.” 
 
 Develop a curriculum comprising a variety of topics for emergency 
preparedness training and exercises that advance collaboration 
across sectors and jurisdictions, including: 
 
 Training that covers the common purposes and 
complementary roles of different sectors, as well as differences 
in their priorities and approaches 
 Training and exercises that transcend current COOP planning 
and specifically address the expectations each sector’s plans 
specify for the others 
 Training on foundational topics — such as principles of risk 
factors for, modes of transmission of, and strategies for 
preventing infectious diseases (e.g., “Infectious Diseases 101”) — 
for law enforcement, corrections, and court officials to increase 
their understanding of the rationale underlying approaches for 
30 
C D C / D O J  P U B L I C  H E A L T H / L A W  E N F O R C E M E N T  





protecting themselves and others during infectious disease 
outbreaks through the use of science- and law-based protective 
measures such as isolation and quarantine 
 Training and exercises on joint, multi-sectoral investigations of 
bioterrorism (e.g., “forensic epidemiology” training) and other 
problems potentially requiring coordinated and simultaneous 




Cross-Sector Coordination Example 
Course Objectives for CDC “Forensic Epidemiology” Training Course 
on Joint Public Health and Law Enforcement Investigations of Bioterrorism 
 
Criminal and Epidemiological Investigative Methods 
• Demonstrate an understanding of the similarities and differences in public health and law 
enforcement investigative goals and methods 
• Show an understanding of crime scene procedures 
• Describe specimen collection and establishment of chain of custody of evidence 
• Demonstrate an understanding of environmental testing 
• Understand the inclusion of “intentionality” in the epidemiologic differential diagnosis and 
investigation 
Operations and Procedures 
• Demonstrate an understanding of controlling laws and sources of authorities for actions 
• Demonstrate an understanding of legal issues surrounding bioterrorism 
• Determine jurisdictional lead responsibilities 
• Identify additional resources to call and when to call 
• Recognize when to involve the other discipline after the problem is acknowledged 
• Coordinate public health and law enforcement during responses and investigations 
• Coordinate local, state, and federal resources 
• Describe on-scene control measures and interventions 
Communications 
• Communicate and share information between law enforcement and public health 
• Differentiate between treatment of information (e.g., privacy, confidentiality, public disclosure) 
• Describe media relations and risk communication 
 
Source: Goodman RA, Munson JW, Dammers K et al.  Forensic epidemiology: law at the intersection of public health and criminal 
investigations.  Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 31(2003):684-700. 
For more information about the Forensic Epidemiology training course, please visit http://www2.cdc.gov/phlp/ 
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Action Steps — “Cyclical” Curriculum  
The Workgroup urged that training be offered frequently and consistently 
to ensure permanent mechanisms for sustaining competencies (and 
avoiding the phenomenon of “one-time events”), and that incentives be 
provided by organizations to individuals in each sector as a means for 
increasing participation in training and exercises.  Workgroup members 
described a “cyclical” training model that places education, through 
training and exercises, within the broader context of sectoral/agency roles 
and responsibilities.  The elements of this model — which apply equally 
for preparedness for intentional (e.g., bioterrorist) or natural (e.g., an 
influenza pandemic or other infectious disease threat) events — require 
agencies, organizations, and multi-sector steering groups to: 
 
 Identify players, their roles and responsibilities, and where roles merge 
or otherwise intersect. 
 Identify the set of skills and competencies required, including familiarity 
with existing plans and policies, and legal authorities for various 
actions. 
 Develop a curriculum of training and exercises that encompasses the 
requirements for competencies. 
 Develop and conduct specific joint training and exercises. 
 Conduct after-action assessments of joint training and exercises to 
determine strengths and limitations, and use this information for 
modifying the curriculum and future delivery. 
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III.   Conclusion 
It is the Workgroup’s hope that this framework and set of opportunities 
for action will spark conversations, plans and concrete actions among 
public health, law enforcement, the judiciary, and corrections — and that 
these efforts will traverse and erode the boundaries separating four sectors 
whose interests in the public’s health and safety are both shared and 
profound. 
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Appendix A:  Acronyms   
 
 
BJA – Bureau of Justice Assistance (at DOJ) 
CDC – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
COOP – Continuity of Operations 
COTPER – Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (at CDC) 
DOJ – Department of Justice 
EMAC – Emergency Management Assistance Compact  
HIPAA – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HSEEP – Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
ICS – Incident Command System 
LRN – Laboratory Response Network (for Biological and Chemical Terrorism) 
MAA – Mutual Aid Agreements  
MRSA – methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
NIMS – National Incident Management System 
PHLP – Public Health Law Program (at CDC) 
SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
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Federal Bureau of Investigations Headquarters 
WMD Directorate 
 
Dean Sienko, MD, MS 
Medical Director/Chief Medical Examiner 
Ingham County Health Department 
 
William S. Smock, MD 
Police Surgeon 
Department of Emergency Medicine 
Louisville Metro Police Department 
 
Gary Streeter 
Maricopa County Adult Probation 
 
Robert Sudlow    
Director 
Ulster County Adult Probation 
 
William T. Wardwell 
Inspector 
Michigan State University Police 
 
Roger Werholtz   
Secretary 
Kansas Department of Corrections 
 
Captain Agatha S. Windsor 
Alabama Department of Public Safety 
 
Sheriff C.T. Woody 
Richmond City Sheriff’s Office 
 
Michael Zanker, MD, FACEP 
Senior Medical Advisor 
Incident Coordination Division 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
   Health Affairs 
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Appendix C:  CDC and DOJ/BJA 
Technical Consultants 
Don Benken, MPH, JD 
Public Health Law Program 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Pam Cammarata 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Steve Edwards 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Jennifer Horney, MA, MPH 
University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill 
School of Public Health 
 
Katrin S. Kohl, MD, PhD, MPH 
Division of Global Migration and Quarantine 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Andrew Molloy 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Kim Norris 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Captain Jaquelyn Polder, RN, MPH 
Division of Global Migration and Quarantine 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Joel Pardue 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Hugh Potter, PhD 
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 




Bureau of Justice Assistance 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Dan Stier, JD 
Public Health Law Program 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
                                                  
Workgroup Staff: 
Joe Durbin, MBA 
McKing Consulting Corporation 
 
Robert J. Kingon, MPA – Co-Facilitator 
Public Health Consultant 
McKing Consulting Corporation 
 
Nicole Lezin, MPPM – Co-Facilitator 











Examples of Investigations Involving Both Law Enforcement and Public Health, 1975-2003 
Year Disease/Injury-
causing Agent 
Scope of Problem Outcome 
1975 Pancuronium 
bromide 
51 episodes of cardiac arrest among 35 
patients during a 6-week period in a 
teaching hospital 
Two nurses indicted for murder, attempted 
murder, conspiracy to commit murder 
1980-81 Undetermined Over a 15-month period, 81% of deaths at 
a hospital occurred during evening shift 
Strong association between infant deaths 
and duty times of a particular nurse.  Nurse 
indicted and convicted on charge of injuring 




751 people  with cases of Salmonella 
gastroenteritis, but no single common food 
item or mechanism of contamination was 
found 
Two people were indicted and pleaded 
guilty to conspiring to tamper with consumer 
products by poisoning food and pleaded 
guilty 
1996 Shigella dysenteriae 
type 2 
12 lab workers who ate pastries in a break 
room became ill with rarely identified 
organism 
Lab worker indicted and charged with first-
degree felony of tampering with consumer 
product 
2003 Nicotine 92 people ill from ground beef 
contaminated with nicotine 
Supermarket employee accused of 
poisoning meat with insecticide containing 
nicotine 
Source: Goodman RA, Munson JW, Dammers K et al.  Forensic epidemiology: law at the intersection of public health and criminal 
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